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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, public awareness has been developing 
in relation to the public health risk from indoor air 
pollution. Most people spend about 90% of their time indoors 
and, as homes and offices have become more tightly sealed, 
pollutants become trapped with the result that toxic risk 
levels are intensified. 
One of the more serious of these pollutants is radon 
gas, found in the natural environment, particularly near 
certain rock formations. Indoors, the gas breaks down into 
short-lived radionuclides called radon daughters which, when 
breathed over a period of time, increase the risk of lung 
cancer. 
This paper begins with a case study about the 
discovery of above risk-level indoor radon in buildings in 
Butte, Montana and the efforts of the state of Montana to 
study and determine the extent of the problem. It goes on to 
describe the development of federal involvement which ranged 
from that of an investigative ally to an intrusive regulator. 
The paper explores some of the literature relating to the 
assumption of cancer risk from elevated indoor radon levels 
and the growing media attention to the potential of indoor 
air pollution as an individual and public health problem. 
The final section broadens the public policy context 
by examining recent Congressional and Administration action 
1 
and inaction relating to indoor air pollution in general and 
radon in particular. Governmental options regarding this 
serious public heath threat are reviewed and projected within 
the current political climate. 
Throughout the paper, we see the complexity of 
factors affecting incentives and barriers to governmental 
action. The central focus on public policy implications 
relating to the indoor radon problem in Butte covers seven 
years and is still without a definitive solution. 
One of the major influences over this seven year 
period has been the widely divergent philosophy regarding the 
role of the federal government of the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations. 
The Carter Administration took its role of protecting 
the public welfare seriously. The Reagan Administration 
perceives much of the federal government's previous strong 
role as unnecessary and undesirable. This Administration's 
"New Federalism" policy is that of persistent attempts to 
diminish and dismantle the size, structure and 
responsibilities of many federal functions that had been 
designated to be in the national interest. 
The environmentally conscious Carter Administration 
sought and achieved quick action to protect the public health 
from environmental hazards. The role of government as an 
intervenor and that of a positive force for the public good 
was acceptable. This political philosophy underlies the 
2 
decision making processes in the earlier stages of the case 
study. When early data indicated a public health risk, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development acted 
expeditiously with a non-traditional decision making process. 
Career employees and high-level political appointees were 
free to use the means to justify the end if the decision was 
in the public interest. 
In contrast, under the current Administration, 
official barriers at the highest levels have substantially 
slowed down, but not totally blocked, agency activity in 
research and in developing solutions for indoor air 
pollution, particularly radon. The skillful, committed 
bureaucrat, who wants to make some progress in delivering 
solutions to the problem, may continue to achieve some 
results, but more with counterparts, and through the 
circumspect cultivation and development of Congressional 
action and media awareness than officially through Agency and 
Administration policy. 
Meanwhile, Congressional attention to the issue is 
developing, but countervailing pressures will probably deter 
any major decisions that require funding in the near future. 
In the current climate of deep immersion and preoccupation 
with budget battles, just maintaining many vital programs and 
protecting them from extermination is considered progress. 
3 
BUTTE, AMERICA AND RADON 
Butte, America: "The biggest mining camp in the 
world! "A mile high and a mile deep!" "The richest hill on 
earth!"Under the city twisted 2,700 miles of tunnels, and 
in their dim hot depths thousands of men worked and fought 
2 
and died." 
Today, the mines are shut down and the town is in 
chronic depression. Forty years ago there were many cripples 
and frequent deaths. The Anaconda Company, which owned and 
ran the mines, and the unions, tried to elevate safety 
standards. But rock dust still "filled the miners' lungs and 
suphuric acid dripped from the walls of drifts, burning their 
clothing and flesh." The city's file of death certificates 
provided the tragic coda for the dramatic song of Butte: 
"Occupation, miner; cause of death, silicosis; was deceased's 
3 
occupation responsible? Yes." 
In the early twenties, Federal Bureau of Mines 
officials asked Butte workers to check in for silicosis 
tests; forty-two percent of the 1,018 who volunteered to be 
examined had silicosis--"miner's con." Health and safety 
improvements later brought the "wet drill" and vastly better 
ventilation. The Company claimed that silicosis was 
virtually non-existent. Yet men continued to die of many 
pulmonary disorders, including silicosis, and Silver Bow 
County, populated mostly by the citizens of Butte, had ten 
4 
percent of the state's population and twenty-five percent of 
4 
the tuberculosis deaths. 
Butte began in 1864 as a gold mining camp. During the 
p a s t  1 0 0  y e a r s ,  m o r e  t h a n  2 0 0  m i n e s  h a v e  o p e r a t e d  i n  t h e  
Butte area. "These mines have honeycombed the Butte hill 
with shafts and tunnels and have littered the surface with 
mine wastes. Subsidence resulting from underground mining is 
an ongoing phenomenon as the hill area continues to settle 
and shift."3 
In 1955, mining operations shifted from underground to 
open pit mining as the Anaconda Company began stripping and 
burrowing into the Berkeley Pit. By 1975, the company had 
abandoned underground mining. In the late 1970's, Atlantic 
Richfield (ARCO) acquired the Anaconda Company and continued 
Berkeley Pit operations until July, 1982. In early 1983, 
ARCO announced that Butte mining operations would terminate 
on July 1 , 1 983. It was cheaper to import copper from 
abroad.^ 
Geological Underpinnings 
Butte's geology underpins its long, rich, and 
sometimes dangerous mining history. Butte lies in the 
Boulder Batholith, a mass of granitic rock. As it was 
created, the crust was subject to outside pressures. Stress 
fields solidified during the cooling causing faults and 
fissures, or breaks in the rocks. Within these faults flowed 
7 
many hot liquids which later became mineral deposits. 
5 
The Butte mineral deposit is ranked as world class. 
From 1880 to 1964, enough ore was mined to produce more than 
16 billion pounds of copper, more than 4 billion pounds of 
zinc, 3 billion pounds of maganese, 699 million ounces of 
O 
silver and 2-1/2 million ounces of gold. 
In the past seven years, the tough, stoic citizens of 
Butte have learned of another potentially deadly hazard 
invading their lives and their lungs. This time, radon gas, 
invisible and odorless, was discovered drifting into the 
privacy of the miners' homes. 
Radon is produced by the decay of uranium 238, a trace 
element in the earth's crust. Outdoors, it disperses into 
the air. Indoors, it decays into other radioactive elements 
called daughters, that bind to dust particulates. When 
inhaled into the lungs, the radon daughters can cause cancer. 
Researchers have recently estimated that 2,000 to 20,000 
cases of lung cancer in the U.S. each year may be caused 
g 
solely by indoor radon pollution. 
Radon Discovered Accidentally 
T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  w a s  d i s c o v e r e d  
a c c i d e n t a l l y  i n  1 9 7 7  b y  L a r r y  L l o y d ,  c h i e f  o f  t h e  
Oc c u p a t i o n a l  H e a l t h  B u r e a u  o f  t h e  M o n t a n a  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
Health and Environmental Sciences. As he was driving into 
Butte to investigate the health implications of phosphate 
slags at the Stauffer Chemical Company, Lloyd had his 
scintillator, a radiation measuring device, sitting on the 
6 
seat beside him. Approaching one area of Butte, the 
scintillator "went off the wall" and as he neared an 
10 
outcropping, it "went nuts." 
The Montana Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences (DHES) then initiated an investigation into the use 
of phosphate slag in the Butte and Anaconda areas. Phosphate 
slag is a byproduct of an elemental phosphorus smelter about 
seven miles west of Butte. It had been used extensively 
throughout the city in construction. It was found not only 
as a ballast in railroad beds and in road and highway, 
parking lot and playground construction, but used in concrete 
blocks and pre-stressed concrete beams and slabs in building 
11 
materials for homes and schools. 
The use of phosphate slag was of concern because it 
had a high level of natural radioactivity, particularly 
radium-226. As the investigation proceeded, DHES discovered 
elevated radon and radon progency concentrations in buildings 
12 
in Butte. The cause was unknown. 
EPA Becomes Involved 
In November, 1977, Montana notified the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in Denver and requested assistance. 
The following April, in 1978, EPA sent a van equipped with a 
large collimated gamma scintillation detector. Staff from 
DHES and the Office of Radiation Programs of EPA conducted a 
gamma scanning survey with the van and identified about 750 
locations having elevated levels of radioactivity. By 
7 
September, this information was further refined with indoor 
surveys and many homes with high radon progency 
1 3 
concentrations were identified. J 
The State of Montana continued its investigation in 
what was thought to be a responsible and prudent manner. 
Governor Thomas L. Judge found some funds to begin a program 
"to determine the magnitude of the radiation problem, assess 
health risks and initiate necessary measures to protect the 
health and welfare of the people." The 1979 Montana 
Legislature appropriated $100,000 to DHES for a 2-year study 
to determine what was responsible for the elevated radon 
14 
levels. 
In April, 1979, informal discussions concerning the 
early data of the initial 1978 survey were going on in the 
Denver federal regional offices between EPA staff and the 
environmental staff of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). Montana's request for EPA assistance in 
what was thought to be a methodical state effort to identify 
and assess the problem was stirring up high concern in 
Denver. Gerald Hannon, Deputy Director to the Regional 
Administrator of HUD was becoming particularly alarmed about 
1 5 
the findings. 
Back in Butte, an editorial in the June 11 edition of 
the Montana Standard stated that: "Checks of homes built 
with, and without, slag building materials, however, produced 
elevated readings in some of the non-slag homes, too. State 
8 
health technicians speculate that natural radiation sources 
are responsible for some of the readings, but they stress 
that more checking is needed before they can draw firm 
conclusions. 
Increasing numbers of Butte residents have begun to 
refuse the team permission to monitor their homes lately, 
especially since CBS-TV televised a piece on the local 
situation. When the study is complete and the data carefully 
examined, the health people will be able to tell us what it 
all means and what remedial action might be taken. The best 
thing now is to cooperate with the study and not get overly 
excited about these early radiation findings. About the only 
conclusion that can be drawn so far from the state health 
team's study of Butte's elevated radiation levels is that one 
1 6 
shouldn't jump to conclusions." 
Three days later, on June 14, the radioactive perils 
of Butte, Montana, hit the New York Times. The lead 
paragraph theorized that "Butte sits on top of a honeycomb of 
old copper mines, and the mines are apparently acting as 
collectors of radon gas and its cancer-causing offspring, 
known as radon daughters." But Paul Smith and other 
officials of the EPA "emphasized that the radon-collecting 
tunnels theory was just that." It just seemed "the most 
logical explanation for the scattered pattern of 'hot' houses 
in Butte." Larry Lloyd, who was systematically proceeding 
9 
with his research, "was considerably put off by a CBS News 
1  7  report on the situation that he considered alarmist." 
Lung Cancer Threat 
By this time, Lloyd had studied about 300 houses in 
Butte and found that those in the Northwest section, known as 
on the "Hill", under which lay most of the underground mines, 
had the highest levels of radiation. For the first time, on 
June 14, the cancer threat was revealed in stories in both 
the New York Times and the Montana Standard. EPA's Smith 
said that "studies in Florida have shown that with normal 
background radiation levels, it can be expected there will be 
3,000 cancer deaths per 100,000 population over a lifetime. 
But, when background radiation levels reach the EPA standard 
of 0.02, working levels (WL), the number of cancer deaths can 
1 8 
be expected to jump by about 2,000 to 5,000." And the New 
York Times said that Butte's lung cancer rate is 54.3 deaths 
per 100,000 population. The state rate is 30.1 and the 
1 9 
national rate is 35.3. 
On July 26, 1979, Governor Thomas L. Judge wrote to 
Douglas Costle, Administrator of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, in support of a grant to the State of 
Montana for $71,075 to add one full-time employee to assist 
20 
with the study for fiscal years 1980 and 1981. 
Judge stated that: "When the budget was established, 
it was believed that the increased radioactivity levels found 
in several Butte homes were due to the widespread use of 
10 
phosphate slag in building and roadway construction. Since 
that time, the following has been found: (1) Elevated 
levels of radon daughter concentrations in Butte area homes 
are much more widespread than previously imagined; (2) the 
use of the phosphate slag is not responsible for the 
increased radioactivity in the affected homes; and (3) 
ambient radon and radon daughter concentrations are elevated 
during some meteorological conditions. 
Because the scope of the Butte environment radiation 
study has expanded to such a large extent, the additional 
employee is necessary to bring the study to a timely and 
2 1  
satisfactory conclusion," Judge concluded. 
HUD Moves on Butte 
Meanwhile, in Denver, a HUD Task Force was developing 
procedures for Radon Progency Screening which involved 
discussions with EPA and DHES. Included in the preparations 
was a planned award of a $65,000 Community Development Block 
22 
Grant to Montana for technical assistance. 
On August 15, Hannon, the spearhead of HUD's 
involvement in Butte, memoed Alan Kappler, a member of the 
HUD Environmental Task Force in Washington, D.C. This high-
level Task Force was chaired by the Under Secretary, then Jay 
Janis, second in command to HUD's Secretary Patricia Harris. 
Other members included the Assistant Secretaries and Regional 
23 
Administrators. 
11 
The memo described the problem and HUD's funding and 
insurance programs for fiscal year 1979. Attachments set 
forth the testing system to be used by the state for 
measuring the amount of radon daughters inside homes. The 
$65,000 technical assistance grant was being negotiated with 
the state and all HUD contracts were to be amended. The memo 
concluded that "Although the above process and procedures are 
out of pattern with the Department's standard operating 
procedures, they are essential due to the imminent health 
24 
hazard discovered in Butte and Anaconda." 
What was "out of pattern?" What was unusual was the 
decision that was made and the manner in which it was done. 
HUD has a mandate to insure that all HUD-assisted projects 
are located in a safe and healthful environment. Hannon, 
having access to preliminary data from EPA, pressed for a 
decision that the regional administrator, Betty Miller, 
recommend to the HUD Environmental Task Force that testing be 
required for indoor radon for all HUD-assisted projects or 
loans in Butte. The Task Force approved and implementation 
25 
proceeded quickly, all within just a few weeks. 
This was during the Carter Administration and the 
political climate of the times was one of high environmental 
concern and protection. The Carter Administration perceived 
its role as getting involved, setting policy and intervening 
if necessary to protect the best interests of citizens. 
Because of the political mandate and environmental 
12 
"urgencies," this Task Force did not follow the normal 
decision-making process of the agency which was a more 
thorough consideration and analysis of data and options 
through several staff levels. After Pat Harris left the 
2 6 
Secretary's position, the Task Force was phased out. 
This model of decision making was expeditious, but was 
it fair and equitable? Was it based on sufficient data, 
analysis and consultation? 
There were early indications that there was a 
significant problem in some houses. The high incidence of 
accelerated radon risk levels in Butte, accidentally 
discovered, was unique at the time and decision makers 
accordingly thought the situation merited special protection 
for its citizens, even before a thorough study was completed. 
Radon is everywhere in the natural environment. Didn't other 
areas also have high risk levels? Didn't the health and 
welfare of the rest of the country matter? Aren't all 
citizens of the United States entitled to equal protection 
under the law? Yes, but locating, assessing and remediating 
toxic risk problems is a long, complicated and arduous 
process. Even more difficult is ascertaining private and 
governmental responsibility. 
John Giedt, with EPA in Denver, said that HUD, as a 
"prudent administrator" needed to make this decision just 
because they knew "that Butte might have an accelerated 
incidence of radon. As an insurer, if a home had a high 
13 
radon reading, HUD might be left holding unsafe property if 
not protected by the testing requirement." But now, Giedt 
agrees that "it's so unfair to single out Butte and not be 
27 
able to give them a solution." John Endres, who, in 1979, 
was special assistant to HUD's Regional Administrator in 
Denver, now says, that "at the time it was a good decision. 
It was made at a time which predated setting up procedures. 
2 8 
But now, Butte is out there all by itself." 
With no local input and very incomplete information as 
to the specifics or extent of the potential radiation 
problem, HUD on September 13, 1979, precipitiously announced 
a clamp on "all current HUD funds for public housing and 
future private housing insurance loans by FHA unless homes 
are tested for radiation levels." John Endres announced the 
ruling. "It's HUD's policy to protect the individual home 
buyer's health and welfare when using HUD money for Federal 
Housing Administration loans or living in a public housing 
project funded by HUD," Endres said. "If a home or housing 
unit is above 0.02 working levels of radiation, the loan will 
be denied. HUD will provide the state health department with 
a $65,000 grant to hire two persons to conduct tests for 
public housing. But sellers seeking FHA loans for private 
29 
sale must pay $52 to cover the costs of the tests." 
Butte Reacts in Shock and Dismay 
The reaction in Butte to the sudden announcement was 
basically that of shock and dismay. Gladys Barry, Anaconda 
14 
Housing Authority Director, said the ruling came "like a bolt 
out of the blue." Chief Executive Don Peoples said, "What 
bothers me is that the EPA has no conclusive evidence there's 
a health hazard here. We're caught in a squeeze between HUD 
and EPA."30 
Betty Kissock of Kissock Realty reacted, "It's a 
typical bureaucracy. I don't see why the same standards 
couldn't be set up across the country instead of just Butte 
and Anaconda." Kissock went on to say "People are really 
angry. I think we'd better get to the bottom of the charges 
and find out how much radiation is here before HUD can issue 
statements like that." Louise Wulf of Wulf Realty said it 
even more strongly. "I think it's an awful kick. It's 
31 
cutting our throats." 
Perhaps the most cynical response of all came from 
State Representative Bob Pavlovich and Pat Kinney, Executive 
Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce when they "agreed 
over beers at Mr. Pavlovich's Met Tavern that the basic 
problem was overexcited environmentalists. It was the 
consensus among the tavern patrons that "environmentalists 
32 
were a greater hazard than radiation." 
The congressional delegation, Senators Baucus, Melcher 
and Representative Williams wrote asking for immediate 
testing of the area by EPA "because there does not appear to 
have been adequate public input prior to the HUD decision and 
because the decision on HUD loans can affect the availability 
15 
of any housing money." Melcher told the Montana Standard, 
"My feeling is there is probably a lot of the area that does 
not have the radon gas. I think they should identify the 
specific houses they are claiming to have high radiation 
3 3  
levels and provide rehabilitation for those homes." 
EPA Chief Costle replied to Governor Judge on 
September 26, 1979, reviewing the cooperative efforts of the 
past two years between EPA and DHES. He suggested exploring 
further assistance to Montana with the requested funding in 
the form of a contractual agreement between DHES and EPA's 
Office of Radiation Programs. Under such an arrangement, EPA 
3 4 
would receive a report of the radiological data. An 
extensive 3-year study ensued which was released in July, 
1983. The original grant was to be for $81,804, but the 
35 
final estimated cost was close to a million dollars. 
Inspection procedures officially began on September 
17, 1979. The Montana Department of Health and Environmental 
S c i e n c e s ,  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  E P A ,  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  
furnished to HUD a radiation survey protocol which defined 
the criteria and methodology of the tests. Two criteria were 
set. One was the 0.02 weighted indoor working level "that 
the Administrator of EPA had found as the acceptable level in 
terms of the increasing long term risk of lung cancer in the 
e x p o s e d  p o p u l a t i o n . "  A l s o ,  i f  a  w e i g h t e d  i n d o o r  w o r k i n g  
level measurement exceeded 0.015 WL, an additional set of 
16 
m e a s u r e m e n t s  w a s  t o  b e  m a d e  o n  a n o t h e r  d a y  f o r  
verification. 
Betty Miller, HUD Regional Administrator, in a speech 
to the Montana Realtors on October 5, defended HUD's action. 
She said that as a result of discussions with EPA, they 
became convinced that HUD "could not simply ignore the 
problem." She also recognized the uncertainties of having no 
national standard for exposure limits, no clear understanding 
of the source or sources of the radon gas and the lack of 
knowledge of the location and number of homes with excessive 
levels of radiation. But, she said that if HUD were to take 
no action, they "might be placing a family in a potentially 
hazardous situation when it had every right to expect that 
HUD would do everything possible to be sure that its home was 
37  
both physically sound and healthful to live in." 
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I 
BUTTE RADON PATTERNS STUDIED 
In October, EPA scheduled a two day helicopter flyover 
survey for taking air samples to identify areas of high radon 
levels. According to Lloyd, this project became a costly 
$100,000 failure. The flight did not have adequate equipment 
to detect radiation patterns and therefore the data couldn't 
be analyzed. "They flew too high and too fast. It was a 
1 
disaster before they even got there." Lloyd said. 
During 1980, Lloyd went on with his EPA and Montana-
funded study and the HUD-required testing. The study was 
redirected because it was not clear that slag was the source 
of radon. In fact, a number of structures were found to have 
higher radon progeny concentrations than buildings containing 
slag. Since Butte had extensive disturbances to its surface 
and subsurface geology because of the underground and surface 
mining, it was suspected that this, in conjunction with the 
subsidence and natural geologic fault zones, could be the 
causes of the high radon levels. Several thousand homes were 
2 
to be investigated in the redirected study. 
T w o  m a i n  t a s k s  w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  T h e  f i r s t  w a s  t o  
measure radon progeny inside and outside buildings in order 
t o  t r y  t o  p i n p o i n t  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  e l e v a t e d  r a d o n  
concentrations. The other task was to place about 200 alpha 
t r a c k  d e t e c t o r s  o n  a  g r i d  b a s i s  i n  t h e  s o i l  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
3 
radon soil gas concentrations. 
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A "grab sample" testing process, which took less than 
ten minutes, was used in homes. The most severely impacted 
area was "The Hill," where occupants were contacted on a 
h o u s e - t o - h o u s e  b a s i s  a n d  a s k e d  f o r  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  m e a s u r e  
radon progeny concentrations. The news media gave the 
radiation study considerable publicity, and many homeowners 
became aware of potential health risks and asked that their 
4 
homes be tested. 
Structures selected for testing were chosen because 
t h e y  c o n t a i n e d  p h o s p h a t e  s l a g  b u i l d i n g  m a t e r i a l s ,  w e r e  
l o c a t e d  i n  a r e a s  k n o w n  t o  b e  e l e v a t e d  i n  i n d o o r  r a d o n  
concentrations, were requested by individuals because of 
health concerns, or were required to be tested by HUD or FHA. 
Therefore, the structures selected became a biased sample and 
extrapolation of data for any city-wide average was not 
p o s s i b l e .  T h e  g r a b  s a m p l e  t e c h n i q u e  w a s  a n  a c c u r a t e  
measurement at the time of sampling, but could be in error as 
a standard for the structure because of seasonal and daily 
fluctuations. Long-term sampling was done in some selected 
b u i l d i n g s  t o  e s t i m a t e  a v e r a g e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  f o r  a  y e a r .  
This testing was carried out for about a week every three 
5 
months. 
Many factors seemed to affect the variations found in 
radon concentrations. Such things as ventilation rates in 
the structure and radon soil gas concentrations in the soil 
next to the buildings were important. If a driveway, patio 
21 
or sidewalk kept the radon gas from normally escaping into 
the air, the gas would be more concentrated and instead be 
exhaled into the structure. The testing required that the 
building be closed for a certain length of time before the 
test, even though normal activity on a day to day basis would 
affect the gas levels. Open doors and windows, wind speed, 
traffic in and out of the building, heating systems, the air 
exchange rate and changes in the soil moisture and ground 
frost all impacted on concentration levels.^ 
Adding to the complexity of measuring any stable radon 
l e v e l s  w a s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  B u t t e  a r e a  h a s  s e v e r e  
a t m o s p h e r i c  t h e r m a l  i n v e r s i o n s  t h a t  t r a p  p o l l u t a n t s ,  
including radon. These levels seemed to be the highest at 
7  
about 6 a.m. and the lowest about 6 p.m. 
As the study progressed, it was found that structures 
exceeding 0.02 WL were distributed throughout the city but, 
again, were mostly in the northwest section. Dramatic 
increases in levels seemed to occur in buildings built over 
mineralized veins or over fractures. It was believed that 
these fractures in the underlying geology act as conduits to 
3 
bring radon to the earth's surface. 
Lloyd Reports to Legislature 
Lloyd reported his findings to the Montana Legislature 
when it met for its biennial session in 1981. In a three-day 
series on Lloyd's report to the Legislature, the Montana 
Standard on February 10, 1981, quoted Lloyd as saying that 
22 
the Legislature's "conservative fiscal mood, combined with 
misconceptions about the Butte study, would make nearly 
impossible his quest for additional funding and staff to 
study radiation problems elsewhere in the state as well as to 
Q 
provide the final monitoring and remedial work for Butte." 
The report to the House Finance and Claims 
Subcommittee stated that the original intent of the study to 
determine the uses and risks of slag-related radiation and 
impose controls was no longer valid as the phosphate slag 
"exhales even less radon than native soils in the Butte 
area." The report also examined the difficulty of 
determining the cancer risk factor which is deduced by 
projecting the increase of lung cancer rates among uranium 
miners to the general population that has been exposed to 
radon. But it went on to say "Despite uncertainties in 
health effects at relatively low levels of exposure, it is 
prudently assumed that living in a home with elevated radon 
daughter levels increases an occupant's risk of lung cancer 
proportionate to the levels within the structure and the 
„ „ 10 
number of years of exposure." 
On February 12, 1981, the Montana Standard quoted 
Lloyd as telling the legislators that "Questions persist 
about how to correct the radon daughter levels in homes." 
Grab sample measurements in Butte homes tested through 
December 31, 1980 showed levels of 0.02 WL in 725 of 2,516 
samples and more sophisticated measurements showed levels 
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greater than 0.02 WL in 81 homes. During severe thermal 
inversions, Butte's air showed levels above 0.02 which 
complicated the radon source question even further. Lloyd 
said that, in 1979, EPA recommended remedial action in all 
cases where the indoor radon level exceeded 0.02 WL.11 
HUD came through with a $75,000 grant to draw up a 
remedial action plan which was to be contracted out. Lloyd 
asked the Legislature to increase his staff by two as he 
didn't "even have the personnel to monitor the contractor." 
Lloyd concluded that the Legislature had a "negative attitude 
toward further radon studies." He was right. The 
1 2 
Legislature would appropriate no more money. 
Public Housing Mitigation 
In March, it was announced that Silver Bow Homes, a 
public housing project in Butte, would receive a $470,000 
grant for a "radon mitigation program that will serve as a 
prototype for all government housing in highly mineralized 
areas in the United States," according to project director 
1 3 
Paul Quinn. First phases to test remediation methods with 
radon monitors in a 13 unit "test building" began in June. 
By this time, 35 units were found to have elevated levels and 
1 4 
occupants had been moved out. Fifty-seven of the 225 
apartments in the complex were finally found to have exceeded 
the 0.02 WL. The remediation work was actually completed in 
1982 by sealing penetrations beneath the apartments and in 
the crawl spaces and spraying the undersides of the floors 
24 
with one and a half inches of polyurethane foam. A passive 
ventilation stack was also put in from the crawl space 
through the roof of each apartment. The remediation effort 
was successful as remeasurement of each of the 57 apartments 
1 5 
found that all were by then below the 0.02 WL. 
Is Lung Cancer Threat Real? 
Underlying this entire radon detection, analysis, 
regulation and remediation effort was, of course, the threat 
of the increased risk of lung cancer. In June of 1981, the 
Air Quality Bureau of DHES released its Montana Air Pollution 
Study (MAPS). This was a major $1.5 million four-year study 
of the effects of air pollution on human health in several of 
Montana's urban areas.^ 
The MAPS findings on lung cancer in Butte were far 
from conclusive. Of the twenty-eight Montana counties 
studied, Silver Bow had the fourth highest death rate of 
cancer of the respiratory system, 54.3 per 100,000 population 
as compared with the state rate of 30.1 and the national rate 
of 35.5. Silver Bow County also had death rates higher than 
the state average for almost all disease, age and sex 
categories. Of particular interest was that cancer mortality 
rates were very high for females of all ages as well as 
males. As men were more associated with the risks of a 
mining-sme1ting work environment, this implied that 
pollutants in the non-mining environment might be a cancer 
17 
risk factor for females. 
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Followup interviews were conducted with as many 
surviving relatives of lung cancer decedents as could be 
found from three counties, including Silver Bow. Questions 
were asked about the smoking habits of the decedents. It was 
found that a significantly larger number of smokers from 
Silver Bow County were found in the lung cancer group than in 
a control group that died from other causes. The conclusion 
was that the unusually heavy smoking was such an 
"overwhelming variable" that it could not be isolated in 
order to assess other variables such as air pollution--
including radon. It had also been found that school children 
in Butte and Anaconda had decreased pulmonary function as 
ambient (outdoor) air pollution increased and that both 
communities had high levels of carcinogenic substances in 
ambient air."''® 
On August 14, 1981, the Montana Standard announced 
that DHES would test new passive measuring devices for EPA 
that could be placed in homes for a longer period of time 
with cheaper, faster, more accurate measuring results. By 
now, the EPA contract had been extended to $300,000 which, if 
added to the $600,000 total from HUD and $100,000 from the 
Montana Legislature, would amount to at least a million 
dollar radon daughter search and remediation effort thus 
26 
Remediation Recommendations 
Meanwhile, ARIX, a professional corporation of 
engineers, architects and planners, was completing its HUD 
contract on remediation recommendations with DHES. Its 
report, Planning and Design for a Radiation Reduction 
Demonstration Project, was released in January of 1981. It 
found that the majority of structures with elevated radon 
levels were, again, in the northwest section of Butte and 
that the degree of elevated radon progeny concentrations 
could be related to the area of exposed soil beneath the 
surface. There were three basic categories of existing 
s t r u c t u r e  t y p e s  —  full ba s e m e n t ,  c r a w l  s p a c e ,  and  
basement/crawl space combinations. Twelve remedial action 
plans were presented based on previous projects in the United 
States and Canada. These included detailed techniques for 
sealing radon entry routes, subfloor ventilation of concrete 
slabs, crawl space ventilation and structure ventilation. To 
assure sound statistical evaluation for a demonstration 
project, it was recommended that each of the twelve designs 
be repeated 3 times for a total of 36 structures. The 
techniques developed were based on cost-effectiveness, the 
level of maintenance required, energy costs to the homeowner 
and performance.^^ 
T h e  dem o n s t r a t i o n  p r o g r a m  g o a l  w a s  to  p r o v i d e  
techniques which could be installed by an ordinary homeowner 
or  a  buil d e r  a t  a  rea s o n a b l e  c o s t .  A l t h o u g h  s o m e  o f  t h e  
27 
plans ranged up to a cost of $3,000, this included labor. 
Materials for most of the projects averaged about $500-$600 
21 and could be done by the average homeowner. 
Monitoring both costs and radiation levels closely at 
every stage of the demonstration project would also be 
essential to determine the most cost-effective means of 
r e d u c i n g  or  p r e v e n t i n g  e l e v a t e d  r a d o n  d a u g h t e r  
22 
concentrations. 
By March, Larry Lloyd had submitted a written report. 
He found that ARIX had done a good job of assessing structure 
types in Butte which are prone to elevated radon daughter 
concentrations. Slab-on-grade construction types could not 
be investigated as this building technique is essentially 
unused in Butte. He also noted that it may not be possible 
to test remedial techniques in new construction as the 
depressed economy in Butte had brought the building of new 
homes to a standstill. Lloyd felt that homeowners would not 
be very likely to use techniques involving much structural 
ventilation because of the increased energy costs. He 
concluded that any "reputable architecture/engineering firm 
should be able to extrapolate the remedial design detail to 
site specific locations with little difficulty." Costs for 
the project, in 1982 dollars, were estimated to range from 
$ 1 4 5 , 1 1 7  f o r  t w e l v e  s t r u c t u r e s  t o  $ 2 7 1 , 3 1 7  f o r  3 6  
23 
structures. 
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The second stage of the remediation project, the 
demonstration itself was to have been funded by HUD. But HUD 
did not follow through on trying to show homeowners how they 
might protect themselves from the radon risk, maintaining 
that funding for the second year grant was no longer 
available. The demonstration grant proposal was later 
24 
submitted to EPA. 
HUD Pressed to Rescind 
In 1983, events began pressing for some action. 
Lloyd's comprehensive study evaluating radon sources and 
phosphate slag in Butte was published in June. It concluded 
that ambient air, soils and surface geology all contributed 
to the indoor radon problem. As expected, homes built over 
major fractures or mineralized veins were the most severely 
affected and aplite, quartz monzonite and soils also 
contributed to higher rates. Ambient air was also thought to 
be a possibly significant source of indoor radon during 
25 
certain atmospheric conditions. 
The HUD contract to DHES for radon testing for FHA 
financing and in public housing was running out on June 30. 
Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Don Peoples wrote to the 
Congressional delegation on March 18. He stated that "in my 
view, the real need for this radiation testing has never been 
justified. On June 30, 1983, the State Department of 
Health's contract with HUD will cease and we will no longer 
have a mechanism with which to comply with regulations. This 
29 
means there could be no more FHA loans made on previous loans 
nor could Public Housing Assistance programs continue. This 
situation could have disastrous effects on this community. 
If conveyance of homes through FHA is precluded, another 
crippling blow will be dealt. In our view there, there is 
absolutely no justification for continuation of the testing 
policy."2^ 
Senator Melcher then wrote to HUD Secretary Samuel R. 
Pierce, Jr. restating the position of Don Peoples and asking 
that the Department "accelerate its review process and remove 
27 
the requirement for radon testing." 
HUD did not reply. With the deadline approaching 
fast, staff from the offices of Senators Melcher and Baucus 
and Rep. Pat Williams called for a meeting with HUD 
offic i a l s .  O n  Ju n e  2 8 ,  Con g r e s s i o n a l  s t a f f  m e t  w i t h  J i m  
Christopulos, Senior Environmental Engineer, Steve Cooley of 
the Housing Division and Pierre Brosseau, Office of Field 
Coordination. Staff stated that it had been two months since 
letters had been written asking that the testing requirement 
be lifted as Butte had been unfairly singled out. Any health 
hazard had been blown out of proportion, they felt. The 
radon incident was the result of natural phenomenon which had 
been there for hundreds of years, and people had been living 
there for hundreds of years, they said. 
Congressional staff asked for the criteria used to 
make the decision to require radon testing in Butte, the 
30 
criteria used to determine the health hazard, a listing of 
all other cities in the United States where HUD requires 
radon testing for FHA conveyance (the answer was none), a 
listing of all other communities in the United States that 
had  s i m i l a r  r a d o n  l e v e l s  an d  t h e  r e a s o n  t h a t  H U D  d i d n ' t  
require testing there. It was strongly recommended that the 
test requirement for Butte be dropped or that it be imposed 
in other areas with high radon levels such as Maine, Utah and 
other mining areas. 
Complex HUD Decisionmaking 
HUD officials at the meeting advised Congressional 
s t a f f  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  w o u l d  be  ma d e  a t  t h e  
Sec r e t a r i a l  l e v e l ,  a f t e r  f i r s t  b e i n g  s i g n e d  o f f  a t  a l l  
program levels. 
The press reported again on June 24 that the local 
government would have to take over the tests July 1. The 
story quoted Senator Melcher's May 5 letter to Secretary 
Pierce and his statement that staffers from his office and 
fr o m  o f f i c e s  o f  Rep .  P a t  Wil l i a m s  a n d  S e n a t o r  M a x  B a u c u s  
would meet with "undersecretary level HUD people...at least 
we are going to get to talk to the level of people who can 
take action."2® 
And still, nothing happened. Congressional staff had 
done enough checking by now to learn that Butte was not a 
community unique in having elevated radon levels. In January 
of 1984, Senator Melcher wrote another letter to Secretary 
31 
Pierce. He said that the "Department seemed to be having a 
difficult time making a decision on his request to identify 
the health hazard of radon in Butte or not interfere with 
house sales." He said, "There is a clear and simple choice. 
Either stop unfairly singling out Butte for this radon 
testing requirement or apply it uniformly and equitably to 
every other community in the United States with similar radon 
levels and identify the health hazards." Melcher went on to 
cite other areas in the country with identified higher radon 
levels where HUD was not requiring the radon test. He said 
he felt the proper way to handle radon problems was through 
s t a t e  and l o c a l  e f f o r t s ,  w i t h  f e d e r a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  o f  
identification and remediation for homes with elevated radon 
29 
levels. 
In the over five years that HUD required radon testing 
for FHA loan approval in Butte, only two out of 425 homes 
30 
tested have been above the 0.02 WL. The City-County Health 
Officer, Bill Burke, who is responsible for the testing says 
it is valid and people don't try to sabotage findings by 
3 1 
o p e n i n g  d o o r s  and  wi n d o w s .  H o w e v e r ,  B e t t y  K i s s o c k ,  a  
longtime, leading Butte realtor feels that the test is a 
"sham." She suspects that people do open their windows 
because they are under so much pressure and FHA financing is 
the only way they can sell a house. She vehemently continues 
to feel it is an imposition and terribly unfair, but says it 
does not generally impede sales since would-be buyers are 
32 
simply told it is a requirement and only one or two homes 
"3? 
have tested above the risk level. 
Following the January, 1984, Melcher letter, staff 
c h e c k e d  wit h  P i e r r e  B r o u s s e a u  i n  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  F i e l d  
Coordination of HUD who had been handed the responsibility of 
d e v e l o p i n g  a d e c i s i o n  abs t r a c t  o n  t h e  is s u e  fo r  t h e  
Sec r e t a r y .  P r e p a r i n g  a  re s p o n s e  t o  t h e  le t t e r s  f r o m  t h e  
Montana Senators, Representatives, Governor and Butte-Silver 
Bow Chief Executive had become a complex process. 
Normally, all mail from members of Congress is first 
routed to the Executive Secretariat office of the Secretary 
which assigns it to the appropriate division for response and 
m o n i t o r s  i t s  pr o g r e s s .  A f t e r  s t a f f  h a v e  pre p a r e d  a 
recommended response, every policy matter is reviewed by 
ever y  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  t h a t  h a s  a n  i n t e r e s t  in  t h e  
issue. ̂  The Environmental Task Force that initiated the 
o r i g i n a l  r a d o n  t e s t i n g  d e c i s i o n  h a d  l o n g  s i n c e  b e e n  
dissolved. Therefore, it went back to the basic decision 
making process at the division level. 
T h e  let t e r s  we r e  bou n c e d  a r o u n d  a t  t h e  beg i n n i n g .  
They first went to the Office of Single Family Housing and 
then to the Assistant Secretary for Housing. Housing said it 
was an environmental issue and sent it over to the Assistant 
Secretary for Community Planning and Development where it 
went down to the Office of Environment and Energy. All of 
the division heads reviewed the correspondence, but since it 
33 
was more of an issue than they had originally thought, 
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neither division wanted to take action. 
Therefore, it became the responsibility of the Under 
Secretary to whom report all of the Assistant Secretaries. 
Also reporting to the Under Secretary is the Deputy Under 
Secretary for Field Coordination. Pierre Brousseau, in that 
office and responsible for Federal Region VIII, landed the 
job of reconciling the contradictory goals, missions and 
positions of the two divisions and the Office of General 
35 
Counsel. 
T h e  Env i r o n m e n t a l  O f f i c e  f e l t  t h e  t e s t i n g  m u s t  
continue because an environmental hazard did exist. Housing 
wanted to drop the requirement as their main goal was housing 
<2 £ 
production and financing. 
T o  try  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  a l e n g t h y  
n e g o t i a t i o n  pro c e s s  ev o l v e d .  B r o u s s e a u  s e n t  t h e  
corr e s p o n d e n c e  b a c k  d o w n  t o  Ho u s i n g ,  E n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  t h e  
General Counsel asking their staff to state their positions. 
W h e n  t h e s e  c a m e  b a c k ,  h e  put  t h e m  a l l  t o g e t h e r  i n t o  a  
combined document and sent it back down again through all of 
t h e  c h a n n e l s .  I t  w a s  ob v i o u s  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  m a n y  
contradictions, but for the first time, all of the staff 
37 
involved could see each other's positions on paper. 
T h e  neg o t i a t i o n  p r o c e s s  con t i n u e d  w i t h  Br o u s s e a u  
making four revisions in which everyone involved could see 
each other's positions and make written comments. 
34 
Rewriting was based on comments from the previous 
doc u m e n t  an d  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Bro u s s e a u  a l s o  tr i e d  t o  
accommodate the positions of each group and the environmental 
O O 
regulations. 
Finally in the spring of 1984, principal staff that 
had been involved sat down in a conference room for two days 
going over the final draft document paragraph by paragraph to 
get agreement on language. A final paper was hammered out as 
an abstract to the Secretary giving the background of the 
situation with an accompanying decision paper broken down 
39 into various points with a yes, no or comment space. 
Then the paper went back into the final clearance. 
Staff made the basic policy decisions and briefed officials 
w h o  w e r e  t o  d o  th e  fin a l  s i g n o f f  o n  t h e  do c u m e n t .  T h i s  
included the Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries for 
Housing, Community Planning and Development, Congressional 
Relations and the General Counsel. All finally agreed and 
the final abstract went to the Secretary in late May or early 
June of 1984. The document was not available to those 
outside HUD, but it was unofficially implied that the two 
basic points were to drop the testing requirement and to fund 
the second phase remediation demonstration program in Butte, 
40 
for which HUD had claimed to have no money. 
About mid-June, when it was known that the Secretary 
had had the document for several weeks, a call was made to 
Deborah Dean, the Secretary's Executive Assistant. She said 
35 
she had put it in front of the Secretary who had delayed 
making a decision so she planned to have it brought up at one 
of the weekly meetings with the Assistant Secretaries when 
the Secretary was in attendance. Dean fully supported the 
deci s i o n  a n d  s h e  th o u g h t  t h a t  h a v i n g  t h e  f i v e  k e y  h i g h  
officials who had signed off on it together at a meeting when 
it was considered would encourage the Secretary to sign it. 
B u t  t h e  Pre s i d e n t i a l  ca m p a i g n  w a s  get t i n g  o f f  t h e  
ground and very few policy decisions are made anywhere in 
government during an election. At this point, a decision to 
drop  t h e  te s t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t  m i g h t  b e  co n s t r u e d  a s  a n t i -
environmental. The Reagan Administration seemed sensitive to 
such issues in the 1984 election year. The decision abstract 
went back to the Under Secretary's office to wait out the 
election. 
Right after the election, Brousseau reminded his boss 
of the issue. Shortly thereafter, the decision abstract with 
a reminder cover memo went from the Under Secretary back up 
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to the Secretary. Melcher's office also started making a 
series of calls to the Executive Secretariat's office and the 
office of Congressional Relations. The response was that the 
Secretary was very aware of the problem, and it was a "hot 
political issue." 
HUD Decides 
Finally, in July, 1985, Secretary Pierce replied to 
Senator Melcher -- more than a year and a half after the 
36 
Senator's strong request and more than a year after the 
Secr e t a r y  h a d  b e e n  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a ca r e f u l l y  p r e p a r e d  
decision abstract. 
The decision was to rescind the testing requirement 
and to jointly announce, with EPA, a low-cost control 
tech n o l o g y  de m o n s t r a t i o n  pro j e c t  f o r  1 8  h o m e s  i n  B u t t e .  
Residents living in homes testing above risk level might 
finally have a solution to protect them from potential lung 
cancer risk. But, before that solution might be available, 
it could be close to ten years since Lloyd's initial Butte 
42 
radon discovery. 
37 
1 
Larry Lloyd, telephone interview, Washington, D.C.to 
Helena, Montana, 14 January 1985. 
2 
L l o y d ,  Evaluation of Radon Sources and Phosphate 
Slag in Butte, Montana, p. 5. 
3Ibid, p. 6. 
^Ibid, p. 16. 
^Ibid pp. 16 and 17. 
^Ibid, pp. 17 and 18. 
7Ibid, p. 24. 
®Ibid, pp. 39, 43 and 46. 
9 
"New Funds Doubtful for Radiation Studies," Montana 
Standard, 10 February, 1981. 
1 0 
"Thermal Inversions Trap Radon Daughters in Butte," 
Montana Standard, 11 February 1981. 
1 1 
"It's Low-Level funding vs. High-Level Radon," 
Montana Standard, 12 February, 1981. 
1 3 
"Silver Bow Homes a Radon Test Site, "Mon t a n a  
Standard, 17 March 1981. 
1 4 
"Tests Started in Homes," Montana Standard, 24 June 
1981 .  
1 5 
Llo y d ,  Evaluation of Radon Sources and Phosphate 
Slag in Butte, Montana, p. 43. 
1 f\ 
Stephen E. Medves, Montana Air Pollution Study (Air 
Qual i t y  B u r e a u  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  S c i e n c e s  D i v i s i o n ,  M o n t a n a  
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences), June, 1981 
p. ix. 
^Ibid, pp. 100 and 102. 
^®Ibid, pp. 108-110. 
1 Q 
"New Devices Sought for Measuring Radon," Montana 
Standard, 14 August 1981. 
20 
ARIX Planning and Design for a Radiation Reduction 
Demonstration Project (Report to State of Montana Department 
38 
of Health and Environmental Sciences) January, 1982 pp. i 
and ii. 
21Ibid, p. 4-14. 
22Ibid., p. 4-17. 
23 
Larr y  L l o y d ,  Ev a l u a t i o n  o f  AR I X  R e p o r t  En t i t l e d  
"Planning and Design for a Radiation Reduction Demonstration 
P r o j e c t "  ( M o n t a n a  S t a t e  De p a r t m e n t  o~f H e a l t h  a n d  
Environmental Sciences), March 1981, pp. 5, 6, 7 and 10. 
24 
Larry Lloyd, telephone interview, Washington, D.C. 
to Helena Montana, 14 January 1985. 
25 
Larr y  L l o y d ,  Ev a l u a t i o n  o f  R a d o n  S o u r c e s  and  
Phosphate Slag in Butte, Montana, p. 74. 
2 6 
Donald R. Peoples, Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive 
to Senator John Melcher, March 18, 1983. 
27 
Senator John Melcher to HUD Secretary Samuel 
Pierce, Jr., May 5, 1984. 
2 8 
"Quick End Sought for Radiation in Butte Homes," 
Montana Standard, 24 June 1983. 
2 9 
Senator John Melcher to HUD Secretary Samuel 
Pierce, Jr., 18 January 1984. 
•3 n 
Chris Kafentzis, Manager, HUD District Office, 
telephone interview, Helena to Washington, D.C. 13 February 
1985. 
3 1 B i l l  Burk e ,  t e l e p h o n e  inte r v i e w ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  
to Butte, Montana, 29 January 1985. 
32Betty Kissock, telephone interview, Washington, 
D.C. to Butte, Montana, 30 January 1985. 
^Interview with Pierre Brousseau, Washington, D.C., 
11 December 1984. 
34Ibid. 
35Ibid. 
3^Ibid. 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid. 
39 
39Ibid. 
40Ibid. 
41 
Ibid. 
42 
HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce, Jr., to Senator John 
Melcher, July 1985. 
40 
RADON IN AMERICA: THE LARGER CONTEXT 
Butte and its unresolved indoor radon problem is, at 
this point, a dilemma within itself. But it also reflects 
larger questions that remain to be answered, broader national 
and international public policy implications that need to be 
addressed and solutions that should be available. 
Radon Risk and Cigarette Smoking 
First, what do we really know about the cancer risk 
fr o m  i n d o o r  r a d o n  d a u g h t e r  e x p o s u r e ?  A n d  w h a t  i s  t h e  
relationship, if any, of this exposure to cigarette smoking? 
A M a y ,  19 8 4 ,  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  Na t i o n a l  C o u n c i l  o n  
Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP, a nonprofit 
corp o r a t i o n  c h a r t e r e d  b y  C o n g r e s s  in 1 9 6 4 ,  e x t e n s i v e l y  
reviewed research with animals and uranium miners as related 
t o  ra d o n  e x p o s u r e  an d  t h e  in c i d e n c e  o f  l u n g  ca n c e r .  I t  
c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  " i t  i s  n o t  d e f i n i t e l y  k n o w n  if t h e  
extrapolation from the occupational experience to the general 
environmental situation is valid." But it concluded that it 
is "consistent with the present radiobiological concept that 
lung cancer induction is a stochastic process without 
thre s h o l d . "  S m o k i n g ,  o t h e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l l u t i o n  a n d  
differences in the general population as compared to a small 
mining population also complicate the picture. 
A  r e c e n t  sum m a r y  o f  res e a r c h  i n  a n i m a l  s t u d i e s  
sug g e s t e d  t h a t  ef f e c t s  o f  in h a l e d  r a d o n  d a u g h t e r s  w e r e  
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similar to results found in human epidemiology. The major 
findings were: 
1. Tumor production at very high exposures is much 
lower than at moderate exposures. 
2. Preliminary evidence shows that long exposures at 
lower dose rates produces more lung tumors. 
3. The effect of smoking upon radon daughter induced 
cancer is uncertain. One study showed a lower 
lifetime incidence of lung cancer in dogs exposed 
to cigarette smoking along with radon daughters 
rat h e r  t h a n  t o  rad o n  da u g h t e r s  a l o n e .  I t  w a s  
t e n t a t i v e l y  a s c r i b e d  t o  t h e  in c r e a s e d  m u c u s  
production from smoking. This effect was also 
2 
found in Swedish miners. Other studies have 
contradicted this finding. 
An extensive study on lung cancer among U.S. uranium 
miners found "strong and consistent support for a description 
of lung cancer risk as the product of components due to 
radi a t i o n  and  t o  cig a r e t t e  s m o k e .  S m o k e r s  ex p e r i e n c e d  a  
substantially higher radiation-induced risk." The data 
suggested that men who have smoked "twenty pack years" of 
cigarettes experience radiation-induced cancer rates that are 
roughly five times that of non-smokers. According to the 
study, this strong synergistic effect also prevails among 
3 
cigarette smokers who are exposed to asbestos fibers. 
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But whatever the r?lationship to cigarette smoking, 
t h e  e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l  dat a  d e r i v e d  f r o m  m a n y  t y p e s  o f  
underground mining shows a consistent correlation between 
exposure to radon daughters and lung cancer incidence. These 
epidemiological studies of humans that have been exposed to 
short-lived daughters have been going on for over twenty 
years, and it will probably take another twenty years for a 
4 
complete followup. 
As to the possible risk of increased public exposure 
in energy efficient homes with low ventilation or in other 
h o m e s  w i t h  el e v a t e d  l e v e l s  o f  r a d o n  d a u g h t e r s ,  t h i s  
comprehensive NCRP study states there is "insufficient data 
5 
to evaluate these exposure increases." 
A s t u d y  by  LeT o u r n e a u  e t  a l ,  198 3 ,  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  
studies in eighteen cities in Canada "could not detect a 
relationship between radon daughter concentrations and lung 
cancer mortality rates.And a Peking research group 
reported on studies of 73,000 people in Guandong Province 
where for generations the population had been exposed to 
about double the normal amounts of radon because of monazite 
7 
deposits with no adverse effects detected. 
B u t  t h e  ge n e r a l  c o n s e n s u s  see m s  t o  b e  tha t  i t  i s  
po s s i b l e  t o  es t i m a t e  t h a t  a n  "a r b i t r a r y  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
average exposure of the public might increase lung cancer 
rates. 
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A June, 1984, headline in the New York Times read "Gas 
Emitted by Soil and Buildings Seen as a Cancer Source." It 
quoted an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine as 
stating that "radon, a common radioactive gas emitted by 
soil, stones and most building materials, may be responsible 
for as many as 10,000 lung cancer deaths among nonsmokers in 
the United States each year."9 
The editorial was written by Naomi H. Harley, Ph.D., 
Chairman of the Institute of Environmental Medicine at New 
York University Medical Center. She was also Chairman of the 
Task Group that prepared the previously cited 164 page report 
on "Evaluation of Occupational and Environmental Exposures to 
Radon and Radon Daughters in the United States" which also 
contained recommendations of the NCRP. 
Two new studies related to the issue of smoking and 
lung cancer in miners were cited in the editorial. One study 
compared 32 Navajo men in New Mexico who had lung cancer with 
tha t  o f  6 4  cont r o l s  w h o  had  di e d  o f  non p u l m o n a r y  c a n c e r .  
Twenty three of the lung cancer patients were uranium miners 
wi t h  m e d i a n  e m p l o y m e n t  o f  thi r t e e n  y e a r s .  S m o k i n g  i s  
u n c o m m o n  amo n g  N a v a j o  I n d i a n s .  O f  t h e  tw e n t y  t h r e e ,  
information on cigarette smoking was available for twenty 
one. Eight were nonsmokers and median consumption by the 
others was one to three cigarettes daily. The miners with 
lung cancer were also an average of 20 years younger at death 
than were nonminers with lung cancer. The study concluded 
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t h a t  in a  ru r a l ,  no n s m o k i n g  p o p u l a t i o n ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  l u n g  
cancer may be attributable to one hazardous occupation, 
.  .  1 0  
uranium mining. 
The other study investigated the effect of smoking on 
radiation induced cancer with Swedish miners. Fifty deaths 
w e r e  ob s e r v e d  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  12. 8  e x p e c t e d .  A m o n g  
nonsmokers eighteen deaths were observed as compared with 1.8 
expected. In this population with long follow-up, the study 
con c l u d e d  t h a t  s m o k i n g  d i d  n o t  h a v e  a " s y n e r g i s t i c  o r  
multiplicative effect on the radiation induced cancer risk." 
The report indicated that the absolute risk of lung cancer 
induced by radon daughter exposure was only slightly higher 
11 
for smokers than for nonsmokers. 
From these two studies, Harley concluded that "unless 
some threshold for the production of lung cancer exists, the 
risk of lung cancer does not stop at the exit from the mines 
and that about one fifth of lung cancer in nonsmokers is due 
to the normal lifetime exposure to radon with a lung cancer 
ris k  o f  fif t e e n  c a s e s  p e r  1 0 0 0  p e r s o n s .  O n  t h e  ba s i s  o f  
average values for environmental exposure and the lower 
estimate of risk, 10,000 people per year may die from lung 
12 
cancer related to this source, she concluded." 
The implications for Butte from these latest studies 
are that indoor radon, indeed, may well be responsible for 
the high lung cancer death rate, in spite of the heavy 
45 
cigarette smoking of decedents found in the 1981 MAPS study. 
Clearly, more research specific to Butte would be helpful. 
Exposure Risk Level Study 
If we accept the assumption that there is increased 
lung cancer risk as a result of radon daughter exposure in 
the home, the next questions that arise concern acceptable 
ris k  l e v e l s ,  t h e  ex t e n t  o f  th e  pr o b l e m  a n d  s o l u t i o n s  t o  
protect the public's health. 
All exposure measurement has been based on the Working 
Level, or WL which is defined as "that concentration of radon 
daughters which has a potential alpha energy release of 1.3 x 
10(5) MeV per liter of air."1^ 
Because concerns continue to be raised about the 
potential exposure of the public to radon either from natural 
background or redistribution of radioactive materials such as 
from granite building products or reclaimed phosphate land, 
an in-depth study was done by a scientific committee of the 
NCRP. 
Published in March, 1984, the report surveyed sources 
of radon, assessed levels of exposure, probable distribution 
and estimated risks. It concluded that information on levels 
and number of individuals exposed in the U.S. is incomplete. 
But the study specifies a level of exposure at which remedial 
m e a s u r e s  s h o u l d  b e  t a k e n  an d  s u g g e s t s  a v a r i e t y  o f  
C • 4- U • remediation techniques. 
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After extensive and comprehensive investigation and 
analysis of risk levels of various types of radiation 
exposure such as soil, external, inhalation, drinking water 
and dietary intake, the report recommended "that an excess 
risk of death from lung cancer of two percent or more over a 
lifetime for the individual exposed to elevated or enhanced 
1 5 
l e v e l s  of r a d o n  d a u g h t e r s  s h o u l d  b e  a v o i d e d . "  T h e  
specified risk level at which remedial action should be taken 
for radon daughter inhalation was an annual exposure of 2WLMy 
which can be translated to an average WL of 0.04, double the 
1 6 
0.02 WL risk level commonly used and now used in Butte. 
The report stated that radon daughter evaluations 
require "integrated or extended measurements covering a year 
1 7 
unde r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  l i v i n g  c o n d i t i o n s . "  A s  f o r  
remediation, it found that cracks in the concrete basement 
walls or basement slabs were the most common source of radon 
diffusion into the home. These cracks could be microscopic 
1 8 
and still be very effective." 
Indoor Air Pollution Awareness Grows 
In the past five or six years, the radon and indoor 
air pollution risk potential throughout the country has been 
getting increased attention in the scientific and general 
print media. Concern has heightened as buildings have become 
mo r e  an d  m o r e  en e r g y  e f f i c i e n t  a n d  r e p o r t s  o f  h i g h  r a d o n  
levels sift in from throughout the country. 
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The Wall Street Journal in 1979 quoted Jan Stolwijk, 
an epidemiologist and member of a World Health Organization 
committee, as saying that "There's probably more damage done 
to human health by indoor pollution than outdoor pollution." 
Until recently, indoor air pollution had not been considered 
a serious health hazard because, according to an architect 
quoted in the article, most homes, offices and public 
buildings "leaked like a sieve." Studies of air pollution 
inside energy efficient buildings are relatively new in the 
United States, even though by 1979, Sweden, Denmark and West 
Germany had already issued standards for certain pollutants 
1 9 
and installed remediation measures. 
I n  ear l y  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s t u d i e s ,  a g o v e r n m e n t  
researcher in Maryland found radon gas concentrations in a 
model energy efficient home ten times higher than in a more 
typical "leaky" house. In Texas, researchers measuring radon 
emitted from well water found radon gas in the bathroom well 
above a risk level. The Wall Street Journal article further 
reported that Charles Hess, a nuclear physicist at the 
University of Maine, believed that natural radiation is even 
more dangerous than the risks from the Three-Mile Island 
reactor because "people are exposed to it for a lifetime, not 
20 
just a few days." 
In 1 980, the New York Times, in an extensive feature 
story, focused on the radiation danger of radon seeping into 
homes from stone walls and soil. The article appeared near 
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the end of the environmentally activist Carter Administration 
and The Radiation Policy Council in the Executive Office of 
the President had asked the Environmental Protection Agency 
to prepare a strategy for determining more precisely "the 
extent of public exposure to radon and its health effects." 
Aga i n ,  ene r g y  e f f i c i e n c y  e n h a n c e d  t h e  a w a r e n e s s  o f  ra d o n  
risk. The article cited the finding that in homes where 
rock, especially granite, is used as a reservoir for solar 
heat, "air circulated through the rock to heat the house at 
21 
night can become heavily laden with radon." 
The extensiveness of the problem throughout the United 
States continued to be unknown. A survey of nineteen cities 
in Canada led to an estimate that ten percent of homes there 
have excessive levels and some unacceptably high levels 
turned up in twenty-one homes in the metropolitan area of New 
York City. Grand Junction and Durango, Colorado built on top 
of or with uranium mill tailings and central Florida, where 
about 50,000 acres of land has been reclaimed from phosphate 
s t r i p  m i n i n g ,  a r e  o f t e n  ci t e d  a s  ha v i n g  h i g h  l e v e l s .  
Northern New England is another highly radioactive area where 
wells penetrate granite. Radon from the water there escapes 
into the air, especially when showers or washing machines are 
.  22 
used. 
B y  1 9 8 1 ,  t h e  m o r e  g e n e r a l  p r o b l e m  o f  indo o r  a i r  
pollution was getting attention from some individuals and 
organizations who were concerned with environmental hazards 
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and public health. the National Academy of Sciences, is a 
report prepared for the EPA, stated that indoor air pollution 
is a "serious and growing problem that can cause discomfort, 
illness and even death." Representative Toby Moffett, then 
Chairman of the House Energy and Natural Resources 
Subcommittee, said that action must be taken to protect the 
public from indoor air pollution. He wrote to Anne Gorsuch, 
Administrator of the EPA under the new Reagan Administration, 
complaining that the agency was planning to reduce research 
on indoor air pollution sharply and stating that "Since 
Americans spend ninety percent of their time indoors and 
scientists have already discovered over a dozen hazardous 
substances in ambient indoor air, EPA should instead be 
2 3 
expanding its research effort." EPA, under Gorsuch, 
appeared more concerned with budget slashing than protecting 
the public health and welfare. A year later, Toby Moffett 
was defeated in his bid to become U.S. Senator from 
Connecticut. As yet, no other strong spokesman on this issue 
has emerged in Congress. 
Energy Efficiency Increases Risks 
Some research did continue. Robert Fleischer of the 
General Electric Research and Development Center in 
Schenectady, New York, said in 1981 that his studies 
indicated that "the elevated levels found in a significant 
fraction of energy-efficient homes give exposures to radon 
that are equivalent to those that are directly known to 
50 
produce lung cancer in miners with no extrapolation to lower 
levels being required." In a survey of radon levels in 27 
homes, 14 of which were considered "tight" or energy 
efficient, levels were much higher in the tight homes and 
shot up to more than four times the acceptable level in the 
24 
winter, when the homes were closed up. 
For several years, there was less attention in the 
public press to the radon and indoor air pollution problem. 
In 1984, the Wall Street Journal published an article 
comparing the basement home office of a man in Schenectady, 
New York, to a uranium mine with 200 times the radon 
concentration of an average home. Radon from the soil around 
his water well entered his basement through a vent. It 
25 
dropped sharply after he plugged up the vent. 
By this time, high radon levels had also been found in 
areas other than Butte, Colorado and Florida. Geological 
formations in eastern Pennsylvania, parts of New England and 
upstate New York all had above risk levels. The National 
Association of Home Builders recognized the problem of indoor 
air pollution, but allocated only $12,000 to its research 
foundation.^ 
In Sweden, many homes built over granite and shale 
have extremely high levels increased by energy tight 
construction for the cold climate. There, the government now 
sets maximum radon levels for new homes and gives loans and 
other assistance for remediation in older homes. But in the 
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United States, the EPA was still ducking. Although "of 
concern," there isn't enough information about risks and 
remedy costs to establish specific standards said Gordon 
Burley, science advisor to the EPA Office of Radiation 
27 
Protection. 
One of the most significant and comprehensive articles 
on the overall issue of indoor air pollution appeared in the 
March, 1983 issue of the Environment magazine. The author, 
Laurence S. Kirsch, is on the advisory board of the National 
Indoor Environmental Institute and is an attorney with a 
2 8 
background in science and environmental studies. 
Kirsch defines indoor air pollution as "pollution that 
is found in residential buildings at levels that affect human 
health." He agrees with the view that indoor air pollution 
may be an even greater health threat than outdoor air 
pollution. Health effects may be more severe as people spend 
most of their time indoors, therefore, exposures are more 
29 
prolonged and frequent, he says. 
Although Kirsch goes into much detail about the 
extent, measurement and generally accepted health risk of 
radon, he cautions that "conclusions are at best sketchy, and 
those estimates based on the mine studies may be too 
pessimistic because radon progeny enter the lungs attached to 
dust particles, and dust levels are far lower in homes than 
in mines." But he does accept an EPA statement that radon 
exposure inside buildings may account for as many as ten 
52 
percent of all lung cancer deaths in the United States which 
•3 n 
means an "enormous health effect." Kirsch also examined 
the risk of other indoor pollutants--"combustion products, 
formaldehyde, asbestos, chemical fumes and particles are all 
potentially dangerous with diverse health effects."^1 
On January 7, 1985, Newsweek magazine published an 
article titled "Sick-Building Syndrome" or "The Deadliest 
Pollutants of All May be the Ones You Breath at Home or at 
Work." Now, EPA researchers were quoted as finding that 
indoor pollution concentrations are two to five times higher 
than outside levels, sometimes over a hundred times higher. 
EPA environmental scientist, Lance Wallace, described it as 
"We're all living in a chemical soup." And Newsweek again 
raised the radon risk stating that the "clearest danger is 
posed by radon gas." By now, the extrapolations and 
assumptions have become familiar—that 2,000 to 20,000 cases 
of lung cancer each year may be caused solely by indoor radon 
pollution. Anthony Nero of Lawrence Berkely Laboratories, 
stated that "There are about a million homes with radon 
levels over the recommended standard. No other environmental 
32 
risk, such as toxic waste dumps, affects that many homes." 
And then, on April 2 0, 1 985, CBS evening news 
broadcast that the state of Pennsylvania was surveying for 
indoor radon levels 22,000 homes in the Reading Prong area of 
Eastern Pennsylvania which also extends into New Jersey and 
53 
New York State. Over half of the homes tested at that point 
were found to be above risk level. 
A month later, on May 19, the front page of the Sunday 
New York Times carried a story with a two column headline, 
"Radioactive Gas in Soil Raises Concern in Three-State Area." 
The article stated that levels in "some houses were the 
highest ever recorded in the United States." Radon was 
seeping up from uranium deposits in the three-state geologic 
formation below. James Staples, spokesman of the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection, described the 
situation as "an entirely new area of concern that nobody 
even guessed at six months ago." More than 100,000 people 
lived in the area. As in Butte, the high levels were 
discovered by accident. An engineer working on the 
construction of a nuclear power plant set off a radiation 
alarm when he entered the plant. His home was later tested 
33 
and his living room showed 16 "working levels of radon." 
So if there is, indeed, possibly a critical threat in 
some areas, and larger, more pervasive damage to public 
health throughout the United States, not only regarding radon 
but indoor air pollution in general, what are the public 
policy implications? What has been done? What could be 
done? What should be done? 
Options for Control 
Some people feel that the individual's level of indoor 
air quality is his own choice and he should be allowed to 
54 
make his own decisions under free market mechanisms. Others 
view that federal, state and/or local regulation may be 
necessary for products that affect indoor air quality and 
still others think that the states and/or local governments 
34 
should control indoor air quality. 
The federal government has shown a broadly based, but 
haphazard interest in the topic, with at least eleven 
different agencies involved to some extent at one time or 
another. But until recently, Congress hasn't given any 
specific direction to the federal government in either indoor 
3 5 
air research or control. As a result, the current 
statutory and common law mechanisms for dealing with indoor 
air pollution and its potential health risks are inadequate 
and uncertain; what programs there are "have been 
3 6 
contradictory in some cases and redundant in others." 
Kirsch considers that federal agencies are not acting 
on indoor air pollution for the following reasons: 
1. Regulators have lacked extensive scientific 
information on which to base their actions. 
2. Some regulators fear that recognition of an indoor 
air pollution problem would increase pressure to 
weaken outdoor air quality standards. 
3. Regulators are reluctant to intrude into private 
homes. 
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4. Regulators have not shown great concern because 
they have not been subject to public pressure to 
regulate indoor pollution. 
5. Most importantly, regulators have been reluctant 
37 
to act without unequivocal statutory authority. 
The major federal laws that might be used to regulate 
indoor air pollution are the Clean Air Act, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act and the Comsumer Product Safety Act. 
There are also other federal statutes and state and local 
laws that could be used. The Clean Air Act seems to be the 
most obvious law for controlling indoor air pollution. Its 
mandate is broad enough in that it gives the EPA authority to 
regulate air pollution in the ambient air so as "to protect 
and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as 
to promote the public health and welfare and the productive 
capacity of its population." Congress appears not to have 
considered the question and therefore did not specifically 
include or exclude indoor air when the Act was passed in 1970 
or amended in 1977.^ 
However, EPA has defined its authority as specifically 
regulating only outdoor air quality. Administrator Anne 
Gorsuch had even stated that EPA did not have the legal 
authority to do research on indoor air pollution. There is 
one section of the Act that EPA has used for authoritative 
action in controlling one indoor pollutant. This is Section 
112 which permits swift regulation for especially dangerous 
56 
pollutants and EPA has used it to stop spraying of asbestos 
39 
insulation and decorative products inside buildings. 
More specific to radon, the NCRP concludes that there 
is "no current legislation that provides any particularly 
useful guidance with respect to a workable approach to the 
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  r a d o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  in i n h a b i t e d  
structures. 
Besides direct regulation, other forms of government 
intervention could include education, common law liability, 
voluntary standards and research. Research is probably the 
"least intrusive" form of government action and the lack of 
in s u f f i c i e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  e x t e n t ,  r i s k s  a n d  
effective control measures of indoor air pollution is an 
obst a c l e  t o  sol v i n g  t h e  pr o b l e m  o f  pr o t e c t i n g  t h e  p u b l i c  
health.^ ̂ 
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CONGRESSIONAL, ADMINISTRATION, AGENCY ACTION/INACTION 
I n  1981  a n d  1 9 8 2 ,  a  sm a l l  indo o r  a i r  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t  
w a s  f u n d e d  b y  E P A .  C o n g r e s s  pa s s e d  s p e c i f i c  f u n d i n g  
legislation for indoor air research and development by EPA in 
the 97th Congress but the entire bill was vetoed by President 
R e a g a n  f o r  o t h e r  rea s o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  a n o t h e r  t w o  mil l i o n  
dollars for indoor air research for 1984 was added by 
Congress. On July 12, 1984, the President signed the HUD and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984 which again 
included two million dollars for indoor air research in 1985 
and set up a federal Committee on Indoor Air Quality co-
chaired by EPA, the Department of Energy and the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission.^ 
The Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality has a 
Radon Working Group with representatives from five agencies. 
It has issued a draft report and is identifying priorities 
2 
for research needs and for policy-making activities. In 
March of 1984, the NCRP recommended that, without delay, a 
pre l i m i n a r y  r a n g e - f i n d i n g  s u r v e y  b e  t a k e n  o f  1,0 0 0  h o m e s  
within 10 of the largest, geographically distributed Standard 
Met r o p o l i t a n  S t a t i s t i c a l  D i s t r i c t s .  T h e  re s u l t s  w o u l d  
indicate whether a larger scale program would be necessary to 
further assess the extent of radon throughout the country. 
The Interagency Committee has noted this recommendation and 
given it particular importance. But the Committee recommends 
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a  na t i o n a l  ass e s s m e n t  o f  rep r e s e n t a t i v e  U . S .  s t r u c t u r e s ,  
appropriately distributed in terms of climate and geology to 
identify those areas and conditions where high indoor radon 
4 exposures are likely." 
I n  pla n n i n g  for  t h e  f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  y e a r  1 9 8 6 ,  t h e  
Of fice of Radiation Programs of EPA developed a five year 
Radon Assessment and Control Program proposal with a four and 
half million dollar cost. The plan was circulated in October 
by the conference of Radiation Control Program Directors to 
its state members around the country for review and comment. 
The goal of the program was to "have an understanding of the 
distribution and levels of radon throughout the United States 
and the means available to prevent or ameliorate high levels 
of radon." One of the major information needs cited is the 
frequency distribution of individual exposure in "normal" 
settings as this "could represent the greatest exposure to 
5 the public. 
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  19 8 6 - 1 9 9 0  f i v e  y e a r  pl a n  d i d  n o t  
successfully make it through the EPA agency budget process 
for  1 9 8 6 .  A n o t h e r  $ 2  mil l i o n  t o  con t i n u e  t h e  in d o o r  a i r  
research and demonstration program was retained in the agency 
budget but eliminated by the Office of Management and Budget 
(0MB).6 
Officially, EPA has paid scant attention to radon in 
recent years. In 1981, 0MB forced the Office of Radiation 
Programs to eliminate 27 positions and stifled work on radon. 
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EPA appealed to OMB, citing the potential lung cancer risk 
estimate of up to 20,000 radon-caused deaths per year, but 
the edict remained. Since then, EPA staff who are concerned 
7 and want to work on the radon problem have "become beggars." 
OMB continues to oppose further federal government 
involvement with indoor air research or regulation. Probable 
reasons cited by EPA officials are the fear of getting into 
ano t h e r  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t o r y  p r o g r a m ;  a p p r e h e n s i o n  t h a t  
research will reveal serious, widespread health risks and, 
g 
most obviously, budget constraints. In report language, the 
Co n g r e s s  an d  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  c o m m i t t e e  a s k e d  t h a t  E P A ,  i n  
conjunction with CIAQ, prepare and submit a strategy document 
t o  C o n g r e s s  by J a n u a r y  1, 1 9 8 5 .  I t  w a s  su b m i t t e d  i n  
Q 
December, 1984, but did not clear OMB until late spring. 
Lloyd Criticizes 
Larry Lloyd was highly critical of certain aspects of 
th e  f i v e  y e a r  p l a n .  H e  acc u s e d  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  Ra d i a t i o n  
1 0 
Program of "reinventing the wheel." In a letter to Chuck 
Hardin, Executive Secretary of the Conference of Radiation 
Control Program Directors, Lloyd said the overall program had 
merit, but there was little thought in coordinating its 
research with "other agencies that have already conducted a 
substantial amount of the work proposed by EPA." Lloyd also 
s t r o n g l y  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  o b j e c t i v e  ci t e d  a s  
" D e v e l o p m e n t  of m e a s u r e m e n t  p r o t o c o l s  u s i n g  e x i s t i n g  
instruments," since that was the purpose of the Butte study 
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a n d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  L l o y d ,  EP A  ha d  n o t  f o l l o w e d  up  w i t h  
assembling and assessing the data and issuing a report as 
provided for in the contract. But Lloyd was most incensed 
t h a t  E P A  w a s  n o t  mo v i n g  o n  r e s e a r c h  " t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  
effective, low-cost preventative and remedial techniques for 
the reduction of radon concentrations in structures." He 
strongly felt that "we should have solutions in hand before 
i i 
looking for more problems." 
O n  Jan u a r y  1 8 ,  1 9 8 5 ,  L l o y d  c a m e  o u t  wit h  a  blas t  i n  
the Montana Standard saying he planned "to continue pushing 
for funding to rid homes in Butte of deadly radon gas." 
Lloyd said he planned to push for the remedial demonstration 
program at the winter business meeting of the Conference of 
Radiation Control Directors in February and with Montana's 
Congressional delegation. Although he supports a national 
radon survey, Lloyd argued that, "We must conduct remediation 
demonstrations before we go out and find more problems. We 
don ' t  w a n t  t o  fin d  m o r e  pr o b l e m s  u n l e s s  w e  h a v e  s o m e  
1 2 
solutions to them." 
Jim Christopulos, HUD's representative to the Radon 
Interagency Radon Working Group, is of the same strong 
opi n i o n .  H e ,  to o ,  b e l i e v e s  a  n a t i o n a l  a s s e s s m e n t  i s  
necessary. But, even more, after 41 years at HUD, he says he 
is not going to leave until he sees two things through. One 
is  com p l e t i o n  o f  a r e m e d i a t i o n  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  f o r  n e w  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  F l o r i d a  an d  t h e  o t h e r  i s  g e t t i n g  a 
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remediation demonstration program off the ground for existing 
h o u s i n g  in  B u t t e  a n d  t h e  h i g h  r a d i a t i o n  ar e a  o f  
1 3 
Pennsylvania. 
Mitigation Project Beginning 
As a result of the $2 million appropriated by Congress 
for indoor air research for federal fiscal year 1985, EPA has 
begun the first stage of a low-cost radon mitigation project. 
It is a three-year, $600,000 project and will be dependent 
upon additional appropriations by Congress. The objective is 
to  d e m o n s t r a t e  l o w - c o s t  r e t r o f i t  an d  n e w  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
techniques that will be used to provide guidance primarily to 
builders, building code officials and homeowners/occupants. 
The effectiveness of these techniques would be demonstrated 
in a series of field programs which would be installed and 
performance-tested in representative numbers and types of new 
and existing homes. "Low-cost" would be an installed cost to 
a homeowner less than two percent of the market value of his 
1 4 
house plus low cost operation and maintenance. 
The program plan for the project is nearing the end of 
t h e  f i r s t  d r a f t  s t a g e .  T h e  Pr o j e c t  O f f i c e r ,  J o h n  
Rup p e r s b e r g e r  ,  en v i s i o n s  t h e  fi r s t  s i t e  pr o j e c t  w i l l  b e  
underway by summer or early fall of 1 985. This will be in 
the Reading Prong area of Eastern Pennsylvania where indoor 
radon levels have been tested up to 0.23 WL. This project is 
1 5 
planned for eighteen demonstration units. 
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A c c o r d i n g  t o  Rup p e r s b e r g e r ,  B u t t e  an d  t h e  R e a d i n g  
Prong area will share the second stage project, each with 
1 6 
eighteen demonstration units. 
Differences in the attitudes toward and expertise with 
indoor radon within EPA is reflected in the administration of 
this project. Ruppersberger appears to be very concerned 
about the problem and committed to the project. He works for 
the Research and Development Division of EPA which, according 
to Richard Guimond, Director of the Criteria and Standards 
Division of the Office of Radiation Programs, may not have 
the interest or technical know how for radon research, yet is 
charged with the responsibility for the program. An informal 
w o r k i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  s e e m s  t o  be  i n  p l a c e  b e t w e e n  
Ruppersberger, Guimond and Tim Krowe, Guimond's Deputy, as 
the Office of Radiation has the technical expertise to give 
1 7 
the project more effective but unofficial direction. 
Also, there are ways that EPA bureaucrats who are 
deeply concerned about the public health risks of radon can 
work in indirect and roundabout means towards their goals. 
Inquiries from Congressional staff can provide information, 
other resources and expand the network of other interested 
members and staff on the Hill. For instance, the five year 
national assessment and control plan which was circulated to 
state radiation control officers was an internal document 
which cannot be sent directly to Hill staff, but may reach 
66 
them indirectly through state-Congressional contact - or just 
appear in their mail. 
D a v e  Ber g ,  f o r m e r  D i r e c t o r  for  I n d o o r  Ai r  w i t h i n  t h e  
Research and Development Office of EPA, strongly believes 
that total exposure studies should be done with individuals 
i n  a n  i n d o o r  r a d o n  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  c o u l d  a l s o  b e  
incorporated into authorization legislation and Berg has made 
1 8 
himself unofficially available for technical assistance. 
Future Solutions? 
But research alone won't solve the problem. More 
precise data on the extent and targeting of the problem, the 
expo s u r e  l e v e l s ,  e p i d e m i o l o g y  a n d  c o n t r o l  t e c h n o l o g y  i s  
essential, but only the beginning. Kirsch recommends that 
EPA t r a n s l a t e  t h e  res u l t s  o f  sta n d a r d s  t o  gu i d e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
state and local governments and the federal government 
its e l f .  T h e s e  st a n d a r d s  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  b y  h o m e o w n e r s  
themselves, for building codes or product standards. 
Congress could act further and set up a regulatory 
framework to deal with indoor air pollution if and when 
n e c e s s a r y .  T h e  C l e a n  Ai r  A c t ,  w h i c h  i s  u p  f o r  
rea u t h o r i z a t i o n  t h i s  ye a r ,  cou l d  b e  a m e n d e d  t o  m o r e  
spec i f i c a l l y  c o v e r  i n d o o r  a i r .  O r  a  s e p a r a t e  s t a t u t e ,  
structured like the Clean Air Act, might be enacted. This 
makes the federal government responsible for research and 
developing standards, but holds the states responsible for 
meeting those standards. If future research reveals more 
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c r i t i c a l  h e a l t h  r i s k s ,  C o n g r e s s  coul d  s e t  and  r e g u l a t e  
man d a t o r y  f e d e r a l  s t a n d a r d s  w h i c h ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a n y  m i g h t  f i n d  
intrusive and objectionable. 
But any of these potential solutions are far in the 
future. Considering the current Congressional preoccupation 
with the budget and the federal deficit, coupled with a lack 
of support from the Administration, simply continuing the $42 
million appropriation for indoor air research for federal 
fiscal year 1986 might be a real victory. 
In May of 1985, legislation for a modest indoor air 
program was being developed for introduction in the U.S. 
Senate as a companion bill to one that had been introduced in 
the House of Representatives in April. Senator George 
Mitchell of Maine had been sensitized to the radon risk by 
his constituents and he was the prime mover. The Senate bill 
would definitively give EPA authority to conduct a research 
program on indoor air quality, would require a report to 
Congress within two years summarizing what was known about 
the problem, identify needed research and potential actions 
nee d e d  t o  mit i g a t e  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s .  $ 3  m i l l i o n  w o u l d  b e  
authorized for the research program, only $1 million more 
than the modest amount appropriated the past two years. 
This bill was still in the discussion stage when the 
New  Y o r k  T i m e s  br o k e  t h e  fr o n t  p a g e  s t o r y  o n  th e  R e a d i n g  
Prong on Sunday, May 19. Senator Mitchell wanted to take 
advantage of this publicity edge and the bill was quickly 
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introduced on May 23. Other original cosponsors of the bill 
were Robert Stafford of Vermont, Chairman of the Committee on 
Public Works and Environment that had jurisdiction over the 
bil l ,  a n d  S e n a t o r  F r a n k  L a u t e n b e r g  o f  Ne w  J e r s e y ,  a l s o  a 
member of the Committee as was Senator Mitchell.^9 
The next day, on May 24, the New York Times followed 
up w i t h ,  n o t  a n  em p h a s i s  o n  th e  intr o d u c e d  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  b u t  
on the EPA "inside document" proposal to initiate a major 
Federal effort to locate areas throughout the country where 
radon may cause risks to public health. Dr. H. Ward Alter, 
president of a company in California that measures buildings 
for radon contamination, was quoted as saying the problem was 
widespread. Introduction of the legislation was cited toward 
the end of the article saying it would give the federal 
gove r n m e n t  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  f u n d s  to  d o  res e a r c h  i n t o  t h e  
hazards of radon and other indoor air pollution. But this 
sto r y  con c l u d e d  q u o t i n g  t h e  E P A  d r a f t  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  h i g h  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  r a d i u m  " M a y ,  in  f a c t ,  oc c u r  i n  a n y  
20 
structure in the United States." 
Whether it be in Butte, the Reading Prong or wherever 
else in America, the medical and human costs of possibly up 
to 20 , 0 0 0  l u n g  c a n c e r  d e a t h s  a  y e a r  f r o m  a n  i n v i s i b l e ,  
odorless gas in homes, is a public health policy challenge 
that should no longer be ignored. Will Congress face up to 
that challenge? 
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